The Truth, Reconciliation and Reparation Commission on Monday held its first public hearing with Ebrima Chongan, the former commander of the Tactical Support Group of the Gambia Police Force, testifying as the commission’s first witness.

In his testimony Chongan recounts the events of the 1994 coup and how he resisted it in his failed bid to uphold constitutional rule.

Chongan described the security situation in the Jawara regime as “a powder keg waiting to explode”. He said there was a disconnect between the Jawara administration and the officers of the Gambian army adding that the government officials relied on a contingent of Nigerian soldiers for their security.

He said the Nigerian soldiers were in command of the Gambian army and many Gambian officers, including the then Lieutenant Jammeh, were not happy with that security arrangement.

“It was not nice if you’re a national to have foreign soldiers commanding you. That affected the moral of the Gambian soldiers”.

He alleged that Nigerian troops who were given better treatment than their Gambian counterparts during the Jawara regime might have unwittingly influenced the young Gambian soldiers to overthrow the regime.

“The Nigerian soldiers were telling their Gambian counterparts that putting up with their poor conditions would only happened in The Gambia. If it was in Nigeria, they’d have done something to remedy their poor working conditions. They were subconsciously influencing our officers”.

When the lead counsel Essa Faal asked Chongan to clarify what the Nigerian soldiers meant “to do something”.

Chongan clearly exasperated with the question chuckled and said “counsel obviously to overthrow the government and that what happened”. That replied drew laughter in the hall.

He said the security situation changed when Gambian soldiers who were deployed to serve with ECOMOG forces during the Liberian civil war returned home.

“They were changed and the mutinies started. There were many frequent rumours of coup plots which the government never adequately addressed. The president (Jawara) doubled as the defence minister and the security council that was set up never met to look into the frequent coup rumours”.

On the issue of weapons

Chongan said his unit was poorly armed and most of the heavy weaponry were with the army.

“We complained about that to our political masters. But that time it was difficult to be heard because as I said the Nigerians called the shot.”

On the July 22 coup

Chongan said the day before the coup on July 21, they were preparing themselves for a planned exercise with the U.S Army on July 22 and the president’s return to Banjul after a trip to the United Kingdom.

“I usually welcome the president at the airport after every overseas trip but on that day I was told by the Inspector General of Police (IG) not to go to the airport. I don’t know whether I was a suspect because there was a rumour of a coup or some people didn’t want me there. Because my stance against coup were well know in the military circles.

“The soldiers at the airport were forced to empty their guns of all live ammunitions. They were not happy with that request and felt humiliated.”

On the morning of July 22, Chongan said he received a call from one of his officers about an ongoing mutiny at Yundum barracks and that shots were fired.

“I called the IG who told me that he had ordered for the Tactical Support Group (TSG) to be deployed at Denton Bridge and put down the coup. I assembled officers under my unit at the police headquarters and told them ‘we should be loyal to this government and defend constitutional rule’. I ordered the officer commanding Banjul Division to deploy officers at Radio Syd and Gambia High School to ambush the mutinying soldiers.

“I went to Denton Bridge to join the Tactical Support Group and told them about the shoot-to-kill order. But when I was there something dramatic happened. I met Lt Minteh and Lt Jarjue (who was later killed by the Jammeh regime). We received a message from the leaders of the mutineer (Lt Yahya Jammeh and 2nd Lt Edward Singhateh). The message was uncompromising, asking to be let through Denton Bridge so they could get to Banjul. Advising me that their soldiers were heavily army. I told them that in no uncertain terms they would be allowed to cross the bridge. I further emphasised to the lieutenants and their group of rebellious soldiers that they would live to regret their acts and it was against their sworn allegiance to defend the sovereignty of the country and the legitimate constitutional government. I told them to reconsider the act they were about to undertake in their best interests.

“I did convey that order to the soldiers I found at Denton Bridge. Those instructions were to Capt Suwareh – that they should hold the bridge. Lt Minteh was there and Lt Jarju but obviously Capt Suwareh was the senior man.

“As Lt Minteh and Lt Jarju went to deliver the message. I told Capt Suwareh to reaffirm my orders and we should continue to negotiate with the mutineers with the hope of convincing them to abort their missions. If necessary to use force and end the mutiny.

“Later I received a call from an officer in Fajara barracks that it was under attacked and that the mutineers were gaining the upper hand. When the situation worsen I had no option but to return to police headquarters in Banjul to consult with the IG.

” I told the IG that the situation was grave and the army were coming and that we should stop them. He agreed we should resist and if need be shoot to kill. After the meeting, the IG told me to go back and made sure I maintained his instructions.

“After the meeting, remember the police had deployed some units at Gambia High School and at Bond Road. So as I came down of the police headquarters I saw Capt Suwareh and I was a little bit confused but I told him, ‘anyways let’s go’.

“I was not expecting him there because I had left him at Denton Bridge where he was in charge and was instructed to defend the bridge. So then we went. We went to Gambia High School and then I collected the police unit because there was a driver called Gumbo. He was the one who deployed the TSG at the bridge. So he took the police unit and then I went with my driver Lance Corporal Dembo Jatta and Corporal Janneh who was my orderly. So I told the police, ‘now, let’s go and have a last stand at Radio Syd’.

“When we got to Radio Syd I told my driver that the situation was “very crucial, I don’t know whether I will survive what is going to happen next but I will have to fight.”

“So I told him, ‘now you can go back.’ And then I told Janneh, ‘you are my orderly we have to go together.’ So now we went, reinforced at Radio Syd and the road going to Bond Road. So we were there. The unit commander there was ASP Harry Valentine. And I explained to them, ‘now we have to resist.’ Then we were there. Just moments later, we saw the soldiers coming and to my horror, I saw our own tactical group had turned their berets, in order words they had joined the soldiers in the mutiny. And I said, ‘alright even if I have to die, I will die.

“So I decided to open fire and fired couple of rounds and they scattered. When I fired, they scattered around but my men didn’t fire but I cannot blame the police officers. They were not trained, they were not soldiers like us who had gone through military training. So I told my orderly Janneh, ‘let us be on our fours. So we crawled to the ditch at Denton Bridge and then we crossed it. When we crossed it, we saw a car coming we stopped and boarded the car and then drove to Bond Road and then back to police headquarters.

“I stopped resisting because I was with all of my unit and nobody fired.

“So I realised that the next step I was going to commit suicide, I would die. I didn’t run away. So I went back to the police headquarters, actually up to now, I shudder when I realised what I have done. I had a wife and a kid”.

Chongan said he “stupidly hoped” that the July 1994 coup could still fail even after his officers defected to the side of the coup plotters.

He said he went into hiding after the mutineers took full control of the levers of power. He added he was distressed while in hiding when he was told he would be arrested for firing at the coup plotters.

Chongan narrated how Sadibu Hydara and Sanna Sabally arrested him and then Police Inspector General Pa Sallah Jagne, ‘bundled’ him and other high ranking members of the Jawara regime and took them to Mile Two prison through Nelson Mandela Drive.

He recalled his harrowing experience at the Mile Two prison where he was subjected to torture and inhumane and degrading treatment.

“…after one week Alasan Senghore of the Red Cross came to visit us (in Mile Two). And maybe that’s the reason we survived because we were accounted for”.

Chongan mocked ex-president Jammeh’s drinking habit during his gendermerie days, describing him as a “heavy drinker” and a “permanent plotter”.

He said he used to rough up ex-president Jammeh during his gendarmerie days, assuming that was why Jammeh paid him back by locking him up following the July 1994 coup.